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A lot has been said, written and tweeted about the targeted killing of Qassem
Soleimani and the aftermath since his death on January 3. This post aims to
organize the jumble and point to remaining open questions in international law. The
incident may not only shape the near future of state relations in the Middle East, it
will also get its place in history through the legal assessment, because the targeted
killing of a high-ranking military individual in a third state has never occurred in this
shape or form before.
Qassem Soleimani was killed by a targeted drone strike in the proximity of the
Baghdad airport in Iraq by US forces. The involvement of three sovereign nations,
US, Iran and Iraq, opens the door to multiple international law related questions. In
addition to questions concerning the US Constitution (which are addressed here,
here and here), they can be divided into three realms: the jus ad bellum, the jus in
bello and the international human rights law (IHRL). These are all interwoven and
presuppose each other in some way or the other: international humanitarian law
(IHL), the jus in bello, applies to every international armed conflict (IAC), regardless
if the conflict is legal or justified under the rules of jus ad bellum. The rules of the
jus ad bellum can influence the assessment of particular requirements during the
determination, if a hostile act was lawful under IHL. The application of IHRL and
IHL do not exclude each other, in fact they complement each other. IHL must be
read into IHRL, not as a deprivation, but as a “built-in boundary”. Hence, an isolated
analysis of any of these categories must fall short.
The first layer is the jus ad bellum, the questions regarding the lawfulness of an
attack against another state. The UN-Charter is clear: aggression is forbidden and
only actions in self-defense are permittable, Art. 2(4) and 51. While the US did
not use this term itself, the first statement hints to a justification of the attack on
this ground. Apart from ongoing armed attacks, self-defense can just be invoked
if there is an imminent threat of unlawful violence, which requires the use of force.
Retaliation is not a ground for self-defense, a concept, it seems, the twitter feed
of POTUS as well as the statements by Iran could not grapple (any more – Iran
argued this in the Oil Platforms case). In addition, Art. 51 asks for an immediate
report to the Security Council (SC), which the US adhered to on January 8. The
letter refers to the exercise of self-defense “in response” to past violent attacks,
not a viable justification for the exercise of Art. 51. Iran referred to the attack as
“aggression”, a word in itself repudiating the idea of self-defense and, at the same
time, triggering the responsibility of the SC under chapter VII of the UN-Charter.
Because there was no ongoing attack from Iran against the US, it boils down to the
question of imminence. So far, many statements have been made that no threat
seemed imminent and the Department of Defense (DoD) did not prove otherwise.
Without an imminent threat, the targeted killing was unlawful under the rules of jus
- 1 -
ad bellum. In addition, because Iraq never consented to a drone strike on their soil,
the action also violated the state’s territorial sovereignty.
To protect persons from the ramifications of war, IHL’s applicability is not based on
the legality of a war, but on the existence of an IAC. But when does an IAC begin?
Doctrinal interpretations differ. Some, like the ICRC, argue that the first shot between
nations makes them belligerents. It makes sense to open up the protective umbrella
of IHL even for the first affected. Others argue that an IAC needs some kind of
intensity, like in a non-international conflict (and vice versa, that the first-shot theory
should apply to NIAC). Attacks which are not part of intense armed fighting do not
amount to an IAC. There have been violent skirmishes before between the US and
Iran, but no one argued they would amount to an IAC. Can the high-profile target
of this attack change the previous perception? If one does not follow the first-shot
theory, is the attack from Iran of the Ain al-Asad base in Anbar able to change the
assessment regarding an IAC retrospectively?
A third opinion focuses on the relationship between self-defense and IAC. A theory
advocating so called “naked self-defense” is of the view that a targeted attack
like a drone strike, an insulated event of self-defense against a terrorist, does not
trigger an IAC. This theory points the finger to an underdeveloped and under-
researched area of international law: is there room for something “not-yet-war”
but more than law-enforcement after a targeted killing against a state actor? The
question gained attention in regard to non-state actors, but gets a new turn here.
To further complicate things: Besides Iran and the US as state actors, Iraq is also
involved. Applying the “naked-self-defense theory” here could lead to the quite
absurd outcome that the US entered into and IAC only with Iraq, not Iran, when they
killed the Iranian military commander. A well thought out analysis is needed in this
area.
If IHL applies, most scholars agree that Soleimani most likely was a lawful target. But
there are issues to be discussed. Targeted killings of combatants must be guided
by military necessity and proportionality. Proportionality means the balancing of
antagonistic values. The interest in carrying out the military action itself is restrained
by military necessity. This could lead to the following argument: If there was not
imminent threat to the US by Soleimani, there was no military necessity to kill him,
hence there was no proportionality in the targeted killing which lead to the death
of 7 people. This line of argument reads the requirements of jus ad bellum into
jus in bello, Art. 51 UN-Charta into IHL. IHL applies irrespectively of the legality
of an IAC, but the two realms shouldn’t be viewed as absolutely separated. Facts
and arguments bolstering or defying self-defense are simultaneously facts and
arguments to military necessity and proportionality. It seems not just unlogic, but also
unlawful to apply some aspects in one world, but not in the other.
IHRL applies regardless of IAC, but is modified if IHL governs the situation. No
arbitrary deprivation of life is acceptable, but IHL determines what is arbitrary. Legal
actions under IHL are not arbitrary deprivations of life, if IHL applies to the situation.
The right to life, Art. 6 ICCPR must be protected extra-territorially in all instances in
which the state exercises power or effective control over the right to life (although
the US is not following this well-established view). This basis leaves no room for
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non-application of the right to life, because the taking of one’s life is the outmost
form of controlling it. This would go hand in hand with the purpose of Art. 6 ICCPR:
protecting the right to life. IHRL asks for absolute necessity to end a life to protect
from an imminent threat to life of others. Again, there is no proof of imminence of any
threats against anyone through Soleimani.
Imminence is the word of the day, and probably weeks. It is relevant in regard
to the determination if self-defense could justify the strike, if IHL applies and if
the targeted killing was lawful under IHRL. Many other loose strands are in the
bundle of assertions, analysis and justifications. The case is a prime example of
the interwoven nature of sub-categories of international law and the need for more
research and discussion. IHL, state security and military actions come along with
secrecy and a big lack of information and, hence, a lot of uncertainty. Nevertheless,
they must not come along without legal analysis and opinions.
Let’s end this post with something certain: actions taken like proposed by Trump’s
recent tweets about targeting the Iranian population and world heritage sites would
amount to clear violations of Art. 51 (2) API and customary international law (“Acts
or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
civilian population, are prohibited“). Hopefully, it will not come to this other massive
breach of international law.
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